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  The Article examines an array of important legal issues 
that arise out of the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court by Ukraine, a non-State Party to 
the Rome Statute, within the framework of Article 12(3) with 
respect to the alleged crimes against humanity committed 
during the 2014 Maydan protests (Declaration I) and the 
alleged war crimes committed in eastern Ukraine and Crimea 
(Declaration II). It provides an in-depth analysis of 
constitutional law issues linked to the acceptance of the 
jurisdiction by Ukraine and discusses its possible implications 
on the proceedings before the ICC. The Article criticizes the ICC 
Prosecutor’s overly stringent approach with regard to the 
interpretation of crimes against humanity in the context of the 
Maydan protests and her decision not to proceed with the first 
declaration. The Article further argues that ignoring the 
situation in Ukraine is detrimental to the interests of justice.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 This Article is a timely contribution to the debate on the 
relationship between the International Criminal Court (ICC) and 
Ukraine, a non-State Party to the Rome Statute. The debate has 
gained considerable momentum in light of Ukraine’s acceptance of 
the ad hoc jurisdiction of the ICC under Article 12(3) of the Rome 
Statute for the alleged crimes against humanity committed during 
the 2014 Maydan protests and subsequent acceptance of jurisdiction 
for the alleged crimes associated with the escalation of the conflict in 
eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea by the Russian 
Federation. The Article situates the debate on the ad hoc jurisdiction 
acceptance in the broader context by addressing the clash between 
Ukrainian constitutional law and international law. This tension is 
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exemplified by the failed ratification attempts of the Rome Statute1 
following the ruling of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine that found 
the Rome Statute contrary to the Constitution of Ukraine.2 It raises a 
number of important legal questions on the interplay between 
constitutional law and international law, in particular whether the 
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ICC by the Ukrainian 
government was in conformity with constitutional procedure and 
whether such acceptance overrules the earlier decision of the 
Constitutional Court of Ukraine, which required the amendment of 
the Constitution of Ukraine in order to accommodate the jurisdiction 
of the ICC.  
 The Article also discusses a number of legal challenges 
associated with the first declaration lodged by the Ukrainian interim 
government and critically reflects on the recent decision of the ICC 
Prosecutor not to seek the Pre-Trial Chamber’s authorization to 
proceed with the investigation. The Article argues that by taking an 
overly narrow approach to the interpretation of the contextual 
elements of crimes against humanity, the Prosecutor made an 
unfortunate decision that stripped the judges of the opportunity to 
decide whether the crimes, which were committed during the 
demonstrations in Ukraine, meet the threshold of crimes against 
humanity. The Article argues that the Prosecutor of the ICC has 
missed a golden opportunity by deciding not to act on the first 
declaration, as this could have been a landmark case capable of 
enhancing the fragile legitimacy of the ICC that is largely plagued by 
African bias claims with respect to its choice of situations.  
 The Article also addresses a number of legal intricacies linked to 
the second declaration that, in an unexpected twist, was recently 
lodged by the Ukrainian government and extended the jurisdiction of 
the ICC for an indefinite period of time with respect to the crimes 
associated with the conflict in eastern Ukraine and the annexation of 
Crimea. Although the prospects of the ICC Prosecutor acting on the 
second declaration are bleak at the moment, the Article argues that 
missing this opportunity to act would be detrimental to the interests 
of justice and damaging to the public image of the Court, which would 
be perceived by the victims and international community as incapable 
of dealing with ongoing conflicts.  
 
                                                                                                                            
 1.  The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 1 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 2.  Конституційний Суд України (Constitutional Court of Ukraine), Висновок 
Конституційного Суду України у справі за конституційним поданням Президента України 
про надання висновку щодо відповідності Конституції України Римського Статуту 
Міжнародного кримінального суду (Ruling on the Submission of the President of Ukraine 
Regarding Conformity of the Constitution of Ukraine with the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court), Case No 1-35/2001, 11 July 2001 [hereinafter 
Конституційний Суд України]. 
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II. ROME STATUTE CONTRARY TO THE CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE? 
 Ukraine is a signatory to the Rome Statute, although it has yet 
to ratify the Statute.3 The ratification procedure was stalled by the 
ruling of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, which declared the 
Rome Statute’s principle of complementarity to be contrary to the 
Constitution of Ukraine.4 Despite the fact that fifteen years have 
elapsed since the Constitutional Court’s ruling on its nonconformity 
with the Ukrainian constitution, Ukraine has made miniscule 
progress in ratifying the Rome Statute. However, hopes remain high 
in light of the latest legislative initiative taken by members of 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (Ukrainian parliament) in January 2015 
to amend the Constitution of Ukraine.5 Back in 2001, the proceedings 
before the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, which is tasked with 
deciding on conformity of international treaties with the Constitution 
of Ukraine,6 were initiated by the then President of Ukraine, Leonid 
Kuchma, who lodged an application on nonconformity of the Rome 
Statute with a number of constitutional provisions.7 Interestingly, 
the President’s submission was at odds with the official position of 
Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which took an opposing stance 
and publicly declared that it had not identified any impediments to 
ratification of the Rome Statute.8 The President’s submission to the 
Court focused on a number of key constitutional provisions that he 
argued were contrary to the Rome Statute’s provisions on immunities 
(Art. 27), the principle of complementarity (Art. 1, 17, and 20), 
surrender of nationals (Art. 89), and enforcement of prison sentences 
(Art. 103 and 124).9 In addition, he contended that the Rome Statute 
was contrary to the constitutional provisions: 
                                                                                                                            
 3.  Press Release, International Criminal Court, President of the Assembly of 
States Parties visit to Ukraine, ICC-ASP-20141009-PR1048 (Sept 10, 2014) (“Ukraine 
signed the Rome Statute on 20 January 2000.”).   
 4.  See Конституційний Суд України, supra note 2, at § 2.8. 
 5.  Проект Закону про внесення змін до статті 124 Конституції України (щодо 
визнання положень Римського статуту) (Draft Law of Ukraine on Amending Article 124 
of the Constitution of Ukraine (with Regard to the Recognition of the Rome Statute)), 
No 1788, 16 January 2015 [hereinafter Draft Law]. 
 6.  The Constitutional Court of Ukraine also rules on conformity of national 
legislation with the Constitution of Ukraine, interprets the Constitution and laws in 
Ukraine, and gives opinion on conformity of the impeachment procedure with the 
Constitution of Ukraine. See Закон України ‘Про Конституційний Суд України’ (Law of 
Ukraine on the Constitutional Court of Ukraine), art. 13. (1996) [hereinafter Law on 
the Constitutional Court of Ukraine].  
 7.  See Конституція України (Constitution of Ukraine) art. 151 (Ukr.) (stating 
that the President of Ukraine has the constitutional right to submit an application to 
the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, requesting the Court to make a determination on 
the conformity of international treaties with the Constitution of Ukraine).  
 8.  See Конституційний Суд України, supra note 2, § 1.  
 9.  See id.  
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1. on the role of Ukraine’s prosecution office, 
2. on the exercise of power by Ukrainian people directly or through elected 
agents, and  
3. on the legislative competence vested in the Ukrainian Parliament.10  
 One of the central issues in the President’s submission was the 
incompatibility of a constitutional provision on immunities with the 
Rome Statute’s provision on irrelevance of official immunities.11 The 
Constitution of Ukraine grants immunities to certain categories of 
officials, namely the President of Ukraine, members of parliament, 
and judges during their time in office.12 However, in exceptional 
circumstances, such as serious criminal allegations, immunities may 
be waived through a parliamentary procedure of impeachment.13 The 
judges of the Constitutional Court held that Ukraine respected its 
obligations under international law that it was not afforded 
immunities for international crimes.14 Although not referring to any 
developed jurisprudence on the subject, the Court took a progressive 
stance on the matter of immunities for international crimes.15 The 
ruling affirmed that the constitutional provision on immunities was 
applicable only in the national context and, therefore, could not bar 
the ICC from exercising its jurisdiction.16 A less progressive take on 
immunities was advanced by a French counterpart, the Conseil 
constitutionnel, in its judgment on January 22, 1999, which came to a 
different conclusion by claiming that the president of France 
effectively enjoyed immunities during his or her term in office, except 
for the crime of high treason.17 This divergence of opinions advanced 
by constitutional courts in two different countries shows that the 
clash between constitutional law and international law cannot always 
be easily resolved. By undertaking a very narrow interpretation of 
constitutional provisions on immunities in a national context, states 
                                                                                                                            
 10.  See id. 
 11.  See id. § 2.2. 
 12.  Конституція України (Constitution of Ukraine) art. 80, 105, 126 (Ukr.).  
 13.  See id. art. 111 (outlining the procedure for impeachment of the President 
of Ukraine).  
 14.  See Конституційний Суд України, supra note 2, § 2.2.  
 15.  In its reasoning, the Court, regrettably, did not resort to the analysis of a 
landmark Pinochet case on immunities before the House of Lords, which was the very 
first attempt, in a national context, to address the matters of immunities for 
international crimes. See Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, 
ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [1999] 2 W.L.R. (H.L.) 272 (Eng.); Regina v. Bow Street 
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [1998] 3 W.L.R. (H.L.) 
1456 (Eng.). 
 16.  See Конституційний Суд України, supra note 2, § 2.2.1. 
 17.  See C. ELLIOTT ET AL., FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 33 (2nd ed., 2006); Conseil 
constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 98-408DC, Jan. 22, 1999, Rec 
(Fr.). 
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may act in breach of their already existing international obligations 
enumerated in the international treaties that they have ratified (e.g., 
UN Genocide Convention), which explicitly prohibit immunities for 
international crimes.18 It has been noted in the academic literature 
that “a strict interpretation of constitutional provisions . . . could 
bring a state into conflict with international obligations which it has 
already undertaken beyond the context of the ICC.”19  
 The President’s submission questioned the conformity of the 
constitutional ban on extradition of Ukrainian nationals to another 
state with the Rome Statute’s provision on surrender of suspects into 
the custody of the ICC.20 The court distinguished between 
“extradition” of nationals to another state and “surrender” of 
nationals to an international court.21 Whereas extradition of a state’s 
own national to another state is generally resisted due to the fear of 
the state’s concern with losing its grip on the handling of its own 
domestic affairs, the surrender of a national to an international court, 
which was established with participation of the state concerned and 
does not have primacy over the national judicial system, is definitely 
more acceptable to the ICC state parties and does not come across as 
undermining national sovereignty.22 In that regard, the 
Constitutional Court of Ukraine held that the transfer of a Ukrainian 
national to stand trial before an international court was in conformity 
with Ukraine’s international obligations.23 When ratifying the Rome 
Statute, some states took a different path and amended their 
respective constitutional provisions on the ban of extradition. As an 
example, Germany amended its constitutional provision on 
extradition by explicitly allowing for the surrender of its nationals to 
an international court.24 On the other hand, Brazil chose not to 
amend a specific constitutional provision on the ban of extradition 
and resolved the situation by simply declaring its acceptance of the 
jurisdiction of the ICC.25 
 The judges also examined whether serving a prison term by 
Ukrainian nationals in another member state would be in breach of 
                                                                                                                            
 18.  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
art. 4, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
 19.  H. Duffy, National Constitutional Compatibility and the International 
Criminal Court, 11 DUKE J COMP. & INT’L. L. 5, 18 (2001). 
 20.  See Конституційний Суд України, supra note 2, § 2.3.  
 21.  See id. § 2.3.1.  
 22.  See, e.g., H. Duffy & J. Huston, Other Common Constitutional Issues and 
Interpretative Approaches: Extradition, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE AND DOMESTIC LEGAL 
ORDERS, VOLUME I: GENERAL ASPECTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 42, 43–46 (C. 
Kress & F. Lattanzi eds., 2000). 
 23.  See Конституційний Суд України, supra note 2, § 2.3.2. 
 24.  GRUNDGESETZES FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] [Basic 
Law], May 23, 1949, BGBI. 1, art. 16(2) (Ger.), translation at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html. 
 25.  CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5(4) (Braz.).   
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the Constitution of Ukraine, as convicted persons could possibly be 
deprived of enjoying full human rights protection as guaranteed by 
the Constitution.26 The Court held that if Ukraine did not wish its 
convicted nationals to serve their sentence in another State Party to 
the ICC, it could request to have the sentence enforced on its own 
territory.27 In designating the state where the sentence will be 
enforced, the ICC is guided by generally recognized international 
standards on the treatment of prisoners, as well as the views and 
nationality of the convicted person.28 In the judges’ opinion, these 
safeguards would generally preclude a situation in which the 
convicted person ends up in a more disadvantageous position by 
serving his or her sentence in a prison facility of another State Party 
to the ICC that is in breach of the constitutional human rights 
safeguards offered by the Ukrainian constitution to its nationals.29  
 Additional constitutional provisions, which the former President 
claimed were in conflict with the Rome Statute, included:  
1. the role of Ukraine’s prosecution office, 
2. the exercise of power by Ukrainian people directly or through elected agents, 
and  
3. the legislative competence vested in the Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovna 
Rada of Ukraine).30 
 The judges considered none of these to be an impediment to the 
ratification of the Rome Statute, having cited in support Article 9 of 
the Constitution of Ukraine that recognizes “international 
agreements that are in force and have been agreed to be binding by 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, as part of the national legislation of 
Ukraine.”31 
 The most contentious issue in the President’s submission was 
the compatibility of a constitutional provision on exclusive 
jurisdiction of Ukrainian courts with the ICC’s principle of 
complementarity.32 Unlike other international courts, the ICC 
operates on the basis of the principle of complementarity, which 
means that it complements, rather than substitutes, national 
criminal proceedings. The ICC would only exercise jurisdiction over 
the crimes within its jurisdiction if a State Party was unable or 
                                                                                                                            
 26.  See Конституційний Суд України, supra note 2, § 2.7. 
 27.  See id. § 2.7.2. 
 28.  Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 103(3).   
 29.  See Конституційний Суд України, supra note 2, § 2.7.2. 
 30.  See id. §§ 2.4, 2.5, 2.8. 
 31.  See id. (citing in support, Art. 9 Constitution of Ukraine).  
 32.  See Конституційний Суд України, supra note 2, § 2.1.  
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unwilling to genuinely carry out the investigation or prosecution.33 
As noted in the Rome Statute’s commentary, the provision on 
complementarity was carefully drafted to ensure that a State Party’s 
“sovereign right to try crimes committed on their territory would not 
be encroached.”34 The judges of the Constitutional Court misread the 
Rome Statute’s provision on complementarity, and they concluded 
that the complementary aspect of jurisdiction exercised by the ICC 
could not be reconciled with the Constitution of Ukraine, which 
regards the administration of justice as the exclusive prerogative of 
national courts.35  
 In this regard, it is worth mentioning that Ukraine is a signatory 
to the European Convention of Human Rights and recognizes the 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which 
routinely deals with cases submitted by Ukrainian nationals on 
human rights violations enshrined in the Convention.36 The obvious 
question that comes to mind as to how bringing a case before the ICC 
is different from adjudicating a case in the ECHR, given that both 
institutions represent international judicial institutions that—
following the Constitutional Court’s narrow reading of the 
Constitution of Ukraine—should not be entitled to rule on matters 
within the exclusive competence of Ukrainian courts. In this regard, 
the judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine held that the 
individual’s right to seek remedies for human rights violations in the 
ECHR was guaranteed by Article 55 of the Constitution of Ukraine, 
which could be invoked by a person who has exhausted all available 
national remedies of human rights protection.37 When comparing the 
procedural framework of the ECHR and the ICC, the judges held that 
the former was an auxiliary means to protect the individual’s human 
rights, whereas the latter was complementary to national 
proceedings.38 It is the complementary nature of the ICC jurisdiction 
that the judges held as not being compatible with Article 124 of the 
Constitution of Ukraine and, therefore, as hindering the ratification 
of the Rome Statute. 
                                                                                                                            
 33.  Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17.  
 34.  WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 
ON THE ROME STATUTE 336 (2010). 
 35.  See Конституційний Суд України, supra note 2, § 2.1; see also Конституція 
України (Constitution of Ukraine) art. 124 (Ukr.). 
 36.  See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CHART OF SIGNATURES AND RATIFICATIONS OF 
TREATY 005, http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-treaties/-/conventions/ 
treaty/005/signatures?p_auth=fATFp2yA [https://perma.cc/9M7Q-CUS6] (archived Feb. 
13, 2016) (showing that Ukraine signed the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on 9 November 1995 and subsequently 
ratified it on 11 September 1997).  
 37.  See Конституційний Суд України, supra note 2, § 2.1; see also Конституція 
України (Constitution of Ukraine) art. 55 (Ukr.). 
 38.  See id. 
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 The distinction made by the judges between the ECHR and ICC 
is not entirely clear, as both courts may only assume jurisdiction 
when national courts are no longer a viable option, and, therefore, it 
is necessary for an individual to resort to the jurisdiction of the 
ECHR or for a state to refer the case to the ICC. The wording of 
Article 55 of the Constitution of Ukraine suggests that it only applies 
to individuals whose human rights were violated. However, a broader 
teleological reading of the Constitution does not impede the state 
from seeking remedies for international crimes—the most serious 
violations of human rights—that occurred on its territory. It should 
also be noted that the ICC’s victim participation framework is capable 
of protecting the individual human rights of those who suffered harm 
as a result of international crimes within the meaning of Article 55 of 
the Constitution of Ukraine.39 Victim participation in the ICC is 
clearly in line with Article 55, which upholds the individual’s right to 
seek remedies for human rights violations, including the most serious 
violations of human rights that constitute international crimes.  
 The interpretation of the principle of complementarity by the 
judges of the Constitutional Court stems from the lack of 
understanding of what complementarity entails. It is also worth 
mentioning that the ruling was delivered in 2001, which was long 
before the ICC construed the principle of complementarity in its 
jurisprudence for the very first time in the context of the 
admissibility proceedings involving Libya and Kenya. In the Gaddafi 
admissibility decision, the Trial Chamber averred that “the principle 
of complementarity expresses a preference for national 
investigations.”40 Similarly, the Appeals Chamber in the Kenyatta et 
al. case underlined that “[s]tates have the primary responsibility to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction and the Court does not replace, but 
complements them in that respect.”41 Article 17 of the Rome Statute 
outlines a number of conditions that render a case inadmissible 
before the ICC in favor of national jurisdictions.42 The ICC cannot 
assume jurisdiction over a case that is being investigated or 
prosecuted by a state that has jurisdiction over it, unless the state is 
                                                                                                                            
 39.  See generally Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial 
Chamber I (Jan. 18, 2008) (decision on victims’ participation); H. Chung, Victim’s 
Participation at the International Criminal Court: Are Concessions of the Court 
Clouding the Promise, 6 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. L. 459 (2008); I. Marchuk, 
Commentary, in ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 2006–2008, at 278 (A. Klip and S. Freeland eds., 
2014).  
 40.  Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-
01/11-344-Red, Pre-Trial Chamber I ¶ 52 (May 31, 2013) (decision on the admissibility 
of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi). 
 41.  Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and 
Mohammed Hussein Ali, ICC-01/09-02/11-274 OA, Appeals Chamber ¶ 36 (Aug. 30, 
2011). 
 42.  Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1).  
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genuinely unwilling or unable to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution.43 The ICC jurisprudence provides guidance as to what is 
meant by “the case being investigated or prosecuted” as well as the 
state’s “unwillingness” or “inability” criteria.44 The jurisprudence in 
the context of admissibility proceedings shows that the ICC does not 
usurp its power and in fact strives to promote the principle of positive 
complementarity. 
 In the most recent commentary on conformity of the Constitution 
of Ukraine with the Rome Statute, Professor M. Hnatovsky stresses 
the erroneous reading of the principle of complementarity by the 
Constitutional Court, which did not take into consideration that the 
ICC jurisdiction would only be triggered if Ukraine did not fulfill its 
international obligations to prosecute international crimes.45 
Further, he argues that “the principle of complementarity is not a 
problem but, to the contrary, a guarantee against unlawful 
interference of the ICC in the competence of national courts, and is 
aimed at protecting the sovereignty of the State, rather than limiting 
it.”46 Hence, by ratifying the Rome Statute, Ukraine will not deprive 
its domestic courts of jurisdiction over international crimes. To the 
contrary, it will provide them with necessary tools to prosecute these 
crimes nationally, while at the same time offering the possibility to 
turn to the ICC for assistance if the prosecution of such crimes is 
impossible due to Ukraine’s unwillingness or inability to do so.  
 Despite the criticism voiced by many academic commentators 
and civil society organizations against the ruling of the Constitutional 
Court of Ukraine, it still remains in force.47 The question of the 
                                                                                                                            
 43.  See id.  
 44.  See id.; see also Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-
Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 4, Appeals Chamber (May 21, 2014); Prosecutor v. Saif 
Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 6, Appeals Chamber 
(July 24, 2014).  
 45.  M. Hnatovsky, ‘Opinion on Conformity of the Constitution of Ukraine with 
the Rome Statute of the ICC’ (in Ukrainian), April 2014 (on file with author).  
 46.  See id. 
 47.  See A. ZYUKINA, Проблеми імплементації Римського статуту в Україні 
(Problems of Implementation of the Rome Statute in Ukraine), in 60 АКТУАЛЬНІ 
ПРОБЛЕМИ ДЕРЖАВИ І ПРАВА (ACTUAL PROBLEMS OF STATE AND LAW) 419, 424 (2011); S. 
Kivalov, Мiжнародне кримiнальне правосуддя: вiд Нюрнберзького вiйськового трибуналу до 
мiжнародного кримiнального суду (International Criminal Justice: The Nuremberg 
Military Tribunal by the International Criminal Court), in 1 АЛЬМАНАХ МІЖНАРОДНОГО 
ПРАВА (ALMANAC INTERNATIONAL LAW) 5, 18 (2009); Press Release, Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court, Global Coalition Urges Ukraine to Join the ICC (Jul. 9, 
2012) [hereinafter CICC 2012], 
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/Ukraine_URC_July2012_Press_release_Fi
nal.pdf [https://perma.cc/U478-HNVM] (archived Feb. 13, 2016); Press Release, 
Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Global Coalition Urges Ukraine to Join 
the ICC (Jul. 1, 2008), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/UkraineURCPRJuly 
2008en.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2J2-BZVU] (archived Feb. 13, 2016); Press Release, 
Amnesty International, Ukraine: Letter to New President Calls for Urgent Human 
Rights Reform (Jan. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Amnesty International], 
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validity of the ruling has gained prominence in the context of the two 
Ukrainian declarations under Article 12 (3) of the Rome Statute on 
the ad hoc acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ICC. A number of 
important questions surface. Does the ad hoc acceptance of ICC 
jurisdiction by Ukraine overrule the decision of the Constitutional 
Court? If the ICC chooses to authorize an investigation into the 
alleged crimes committed in Ukraine, will it need to look into the 
ruling of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine? Should the current 
government focus on completing the initiated amendment procedure 
that will pave the way towards the ratification of the Rome Statute? 
Alternatively, can the validity of the Constitutional Court be 
challenged in light of the dubious reading of the ICC’s principle of 
complementarity?  
III. TOWARDS RATIFICATION OF THE ROME STATUTE THROUGH 
AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE 
 First of all, it is necessary to consider the hierarchical 
relationship between Ukrainian national law and international law. 
Should there be a discrepancy between Ukrainian national legislation 
and a particular international treaty, international law will only 
apply if Ukraine chooses to implement necessary changes that would 
eliminate such discrepancies.48 Pursuant to Article 9 of the 
Constitution of Ukraine, international agreements that are in force 
and have been agreed to be binding by Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 
become part of the national legislation of Ukraine.49 However, the 
question of the relationship between national and international law is 
yet unclear, as the constitutional provision remains silent as to 
whether national legislation or international treaties should prevail. 
This uncertainty seems to be resolved in lex specialis—the Law of 
Ukraine On International Treaties, which states that duly ratified 
international treaties have primacy over national legislation.50 On 
the subject of ratification, the law provides that international 
agreements with respect to Ukraine’s participation in international 
organizations should be ratified.51 The process of ratification entails 
the adoption of a specific law on ratification that includes a full text of 
the international treaty in question.52 If the ratification of a 
particular international treaty necessitates the adoption of new laws 
                                                                                                                            
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/ukraine-letter-new-president-calls-urgent-
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 48.  See Конституція України (Constitution of Ukraine) art. 9 (Ukr.).   
 49.  See id.  
 50.  Закон України ‘Про міжнародні договори України’ (Law of Ukraine on 
International Treaties of Ukraine) adopted by Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 29 June 
2004, art. 19 (2). 
 51.  See id., art. 9(2)(d).  
 52.  See id., art. 9(1). 
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or amendments to existing laws, it is required that the draft law 
accounting for such changes be submitted to the parliament along 
with the law on ratification of that international treaty.53  
 A reading of the constitutional law provision together with lex 
specialis on international treaties presupposes amending the 
Constitution of Ukraine’s section on the exclusive competence of 
Ukrainian national courts in order to remove the obstacle to ratifying 
the Rome Statute as identified by the Constitutional Court of 
Ukraine. However, one may also adopt a broader view and question 
the validity of the Constitutional Court’s ruling with respect to the 
interpretation of the ICC’s principle of complementarity and its 
relationship to Ukrainian national courts. Having said that, the law 
on the Constitutional Court of Ukraine does not provide a procedure 
that would allow for reopening the case on the grounds of an alleged 
wrongful interpretation of an international treaty, as such reopening 
is only possible in light of the discovery of new facts that, although 
had existed at the time the case was heard by the court, were not 
subject to the proceedings.54 Given that the Constitutional Court 
undertook a detailed treatment of the principle of complementarity, 
this would preclude the situation of reopening the case. Hence, the 
only way forward towards ratification of the Rome Statute appears to 
be amending the Constitution of Ukraine, which is a fairly complex 
and burdensome procedure.  
 The constitutional amendment procedure may be initiated by the 
President of Ukraine or by at least one third of all members of 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.55 Amendments to constitutional 
provisions, apart from the provisions laid down in Chapter I (General 
Foundations), Chapter III (Elections. Referendum), and Chapter XIII 
(Amendments to the Constitutions of Ukraine), must be preliminarily 
approved by a parliamentary majority and garner support of at least 
two-thirds of all members of the parliament during the final 
hearing.56  
 Following the 2001 ruling of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, 
all attempts to amend Article 124 of the Constitution in order to 
accommodate the ICC within Ukraine’s framework of the 
administration of justice have been futile,57 with very little 
information available on the outcome of legislative initiatives made in 
2008 and 2014. Amnesty International’s appeal to the top Ukrainian 
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officials urging them to undertake the necessary constitutional 
amendment in order to “allow prompt ratification of the Rome 
Statute,” as well as the 2008 Coalition for the ICC (CICC) campaign, 
were left largely unattended.58 It does not come as a surprise that 
some countries are reluctant to allow international courts to exercise 
jurisdiction over the crimes committed on their territory and/or by 
their nationals, fearing that this would lead to a loosening of their 
grip on their independent handling of domestic affairs. As mentioned 
elsewhere, amendment processes may be “resisted for fear of opening 
a political Pandora’s box.”59 However, contrary to popular belief, the 
ICC is not interested in expanding its already heavy workload. 
Rather it strives to promote the effective implementation of the Rome 
Statute by States Parties that will enable them to adjudicate 
international crimes in their national jurisdictions.60 The ICC, as a 
court of last resort, will only step in when national jurisdictions 
cannot cope with the prosecution of international crimes and require 
assistance of the Court. 
 The discussion on the necessity of ratifying the Rome Statute 
was revived yet again in January 2015, on the fifteenth anniversary 
since the Rome Statute was signed by Ukraine. The draft law on 
amending Article 124 of the Constitution of Ukraine was submitted 
by 155 parliamentarians on January 16, 2015, for further 
consideration by Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.61 The draft law 
suggests introducing the following provision into the text of Article 
124: “Ukraine may recognize the jurisdiction of the ICC on the 
conditions stipulated by the Rome Statute of the ICC.”62 In the 
explanatory note to the draft, the importance of ratification is 
brought to the fore in light of the current unstable situation in 
Ukraine:  
 
 [T]he Rome Statute of the ICC should be immediately ratified given a large 
number of victims as a result of criminal acts committed by the highest 
governmental officials, as well as given the investigation of crimes that are of 
concern to the international community and, therefore, fall within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC.63  
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 60.  SCHABAS, supra note 34, at 336. 
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 At the time of writing this Article, little information was 
available on the status of the draft law on the website of the 
parliament, apart from a brief note stating that the draft is suggested 
to be included on the agenda of the parliamentary hearing on 
December 9, 2015, following consultations on the law draft in 
parliamentary committees.64  
 However, it is important to keep in mind that the Rome Statute 
does not have retroactive effect, which means that the ICC could only 
potentially exercise jurisdiction with respect to crimes committed on 
the territory of Ukraine after the entry into force of the Rome Statute, 
unless Ukraine makes a declaration under Article 12 (3) and accepts 
the ad hoc jurisdiction of the Court before the Rome Statute’s entry 
into force.65 As stated above, Ukraine has already accepted the ad hoc 
jurisdiction of the ICC with respect to the alleged crimes against 
humanity committed during the Maydan protests in the period 
between November 21, 2013, and February 22, 2014,66 as well as 
with respect to the alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes 
committed in eastern Ukraine and Crimea from February 20, 2014, 
onwards.67  
 The National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine expressed 
skepticism with respect to the ratification of the Rome Statute by 
turning to the example of Georgia, a signatory to the Rome Statute 
that unsuccessfully sought to have the alleged war crimes committed 
during the 2008 Georgia-Russia conflict be prosecuted by the ICC.68 
Since the beginning of the preliminary investigation in Georgia, there 
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had been very scarce public information on the progress of the 
investigation by the ICC.69 Unexpectedly, on October 13, 2015, which 
is seven years since the conflict took place, the ICC Prosecutor finally 
decided to seek the Pre-Trial’s Chamber authorization to proceed 
with an investigation.70 On the one hand, the Prosecutor’s decision is 
hailed as the new chapter in the history of the Court;71 however, on 
the other hand, the decision is also a testament to the ICC 
Prosecutor’s inefficiency and short-sighted strategy, as the 
momentum to move forward with the case seems to have been lost a 
long time ago. As one commentator suggests, by going forward with 
the situation in Georgia, the Prosecutor signals that other sensitive 
cases under the preliminary examination, such as Ukraine, Palestine 
and Afghanistan, are “not likely to be opened anytime soon.”72 
 Four weeks later, on November 12, 2015, the ICC Prosecutor 
issued its preliminary examination report, in which it informs of its 
decision not to act on the first declaration lodged by Ukraine with 
respect to the alleged crimes against humanity during the 2014 
Maydan protests.73 The Article will further address substantive law 
issues linked to the two declarations on the ad hoc jurisdiction 
acceptance and will argue that the ICC Prosecutor got it wrong when 
she decided not to move forward with the first declaration, as the 
preconditions for seeking the authorization of the Pre-Trial Chamber 
appear to be in place.  
IV. DECLARATION ACCEPTING THE JURISDICTION OF THE ICC FOR 
ALLEGED CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY DURING THE MAYDAN PROTESTS 
(DECLARATION I) 
 The refusal of the former President of Ukraine Viktor 
Yanukovych to sign the EU association agreement sparked 
nationwide protests in Ukraine in favor of closer ties with the 
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European Union.74 Two months into the pro-EU demonstrations, the 
government unleashed violence against peaceful protesters that 
resulted in mass killings of and injuries to protesters who took to the 
streets to oppose government policies.75 Despite Yanukovych’s 
attempts to broker a compromise deal with the opposition leaders and 
agree on the early presidential elections in December 2014, the 
protestors rejected the deal and demanded his resignation with 
immediate effect.76  
 Claiming that he feared for his life, Yanukovych fled Ukraine to 
neighboring Russia, leaving the country without a president.77 On 
February 22, 2014, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the 
Resolution “On Self-Withdrawal of the President of Ukraine From 
Performing His Constitutional Duties,” which confirmed that 
Yanukovych withdrew from performing his constitutional duties and 
found his actions to have threatened the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of Ukraine as well as the protection of human rights and 
freedoms.78 The Parliament bestowed presidential duties upon the 
Chairperson of the Parliament of Ukraine, Oleksandr Turchynov, 
who acted as interim President until the election of Petro Poroshenko 
as the new President of Ukraine.79  
 On February 25, 2014, while the interim President still held 
office, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine declared that it accepted the 
jurisdiction of the ICC with respect to crimes against humanity 
allegedly committed by the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies, on 
orders of senior government officials that authorized the unleashing 
of violence against peaceful protesters.80 In his capacity as ex officio 
Head of State, Oleksandr Turchynov signed the declaration.81 The 
                                                                                                                            
 74.  See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, UKRAINE: TIMELINE OF EVENTS, http:// 
www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20140203STO34645/Ukraine-timeline-of-
events [https://perma.cc/UBV5-VA6K] (archived Feb. 15, 2016).  
 75.  See id.  
 76.  See id.  
 77.  See id.  
 78.  Про самоусунення Президента України від виконання конституційних 
повноважень та призначення позачергових виборів Президента України [Resolution of 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine ‘On Self-Withdrawal of the President of Ukraine from 
Performing His Constitutional Duties and Scheduling Early Elections of the President 
of Ukraine’] (Feb. 22, 2014).  
 79.  See Конституція України (Constitution of Ukraine) art. 112 (Ukr.) 
(explaining what procedure follows in the event of early termination of the presidential 
duties). Petro Poroshenko was elected as a new President of Ukraine in a landmark 
presidential election on 25 May 2014. Many world leaders, including the U.S. President 
Barack Obama, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and French President Francois 
Hollande, recognized the importance of elections as a way out of the political crisis and 
congratulated Petro Poroshenko on winning the election.  
 80.  See Declaration I, supra note 66 (recognizing jurisdiction for the purpose of 
having senior officials of Ukraine face criminal liability). 
 81.  See id. (containing Oleksandr Turchynov’s electronic signature at the end 
of the document).  
2016]  Implications of Ad Hoc Jurisdiction 339 
declaration submits that Ukrainian law enforcement agencies 
unlawfully used physical force and weapons against the participants 
of peaceful demonstrations in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities, having 
acted on orders of Ukrainian senior officials, which resulted in the 
killing of over one hundred nationals of Ukraine and other states; 
serious injuries inflicted upon more than 2,000 persons (500 persons 
in serious condition), torture, abductions, enforced disappearances, 
unlawful deprivation of liberty, and inflicting damage on the 
protesters’ property.82 
 Article 12 (3) of the Rome Statute allows for a state that is not a 
party to the Statute to accept jurisdiction of the Court by lodging a 
declaration with the registrar of the Court.83 The statutory provision 
on the acceptance of jurisdiction is a window of opportunity for a non-
State Party to the Rome Statute to opt for the jurisdiction of the 
Court. The jurisdiction triggered by the acceptance of a non-State 
Party may be exercised retroactively—that is, in relation to crimes 
that have already been committed.84 However, if a state becomes a 
party to the Rome Statute, the Court may only exercise jurisdiction 
with respect to the crimes committed after the entry into force of the 
Statute. This means that even if Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted 
the required constitutional amendment to allow for the jurisdiction of 
the Court and ratified the Rome Statute, the jurisdiction of the Court 
would only apply from the date of the Statute’s entry into force. 
Hence, lodging a declaration under Article 12 (3) of the Rome Statute 
was the only available venue to recognize the jurisdiction of the Court 
with respect to the crimes that have already been committed during 
the Maydan protests (or commonly known in Ukraine as the 
“Revolution of Dignity”).  
 Although Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the declaration 
accepting the ICC jurisdiction in February 2014, it was not until mid-
April that the declaration was officially lodged with the Registrar of 
the ICC.85 In its succinct press release, the ICC acknowledged that 
the declaration was relayed to its Office of the Prosecutor for further 
consideration.86 The statement also made clear that the acceptance of 
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the ICC’s jurisdiction did not automatically trigger an investigation, 
as it was within the discretion of the ICC prosecutor to decide 
whether or not to request the Pre-Trial Chamber’s authorization of an 
investigation.87  
 Ukraine’s acceptance of ICC jurisdiction by way of submitting an 
Article 12 (3) declaration is not a unique occurrence in the history of 
the ICC. Similar declarations were previously lodged by Ivory Coast 
and Palestine. The Republic of Ivory Coast, which is not a State Party 
to the Rome Statute, initially lodged a declaration accepting the 
jurisdiction of the Court for the crimes committed on its territory 
since September 19, 2002.88 Ironically, the declaration was signed by 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mamadou Bamba acting on behalf of 
the government of the former President Laurent Gbagbo. The latter 
was later charged himself with crimes against humanity committed 
in the midst of the post-election chaos and currently stands trial 
before the ICC.89 In December 2010, a newly elected President and 
former rival of Laurent Gbagbo, Alassane Ouattara, confirmed “the 
continuing validity of the 2003 Declaration” and, in a letter to the 
ICC, declared that it was “reasonable to believe that crimes falling 
under the jurisdiction of the ICC have been committed” during the 
serious post-election crisis in October–November 2010.90  
 The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) lodged its declaration 
on the acceptance of the ICC’s jurisdiction on January 21, 2009, “for 
the purpose of identifying, prosecuting, and judging the authors and 
accomplices of crimes committed in the territory of Palestine since 1 
July 2002.”91 However, the then ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo 
decided not to proceed with the investigation in light of Palestine’s 
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contentious statehood status under international law.92 Most 
recently, Palestine acceded to the Rome Statute and at the same time 
lodged a new declaration accepting the ad hoc jurisdiction of the ICC 
over the crimes committed between June 13, 2014, and the Rome 
Statute’s entry into force.93 Following in Palestine’s footsteps, it 
would be ideal if Ukraine not only submitted declarations accepting 
the ad hoc jurisdiction of the ICC but also committed itself to the 
ratification of the Rome Statute.  
 Below the Article provides an overview of legal challenges 
connected to Ukraine’s declaration, in particular the contested 
validity of the declaration, identification of key suspects of the alleged 
crimes against humanity, and the narrow scope of the temporal 
jurisdiction, which was subsequently revisited by the new declaration 
lodged by Ukraine.  
A. Problems Linked to Ukraine’s Declaration I 
1. Is the Declaration Duly Signed?  
 A number of legal problems are associated with Ukraine’s 
declaration on the acceptance of the ICC’s jurisdiction. First of all, the 
declaration that garnered support of a parliamentary majority was 
signed by Oleksandr Turchynov, both in his capacity as the 
Chairperson of the Parliament and ex officio Head of State—a role 
that the Chairperson of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine assumes if the 
President is unable to perform his constitutional duties.94 When the 
President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, fled the country and 
abandoned his presidential post, the Chairperson of Verkhovna Rada 
of Ukraine, Oleksandr Turchynov, assumed presidential duties. In his 
capacity as ex officio Head of State, he signed the declaration 
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accepting the ad hoc jurisdiction of the ICC by Ukraine.95 What has 
been questioned in the media and numerous international law blogs 
is whether the Chairperson of the Parliament had the constitutional 
right to sign the declaration in the capacity of ex officio Head of State, 
given the glaring absence of self-withdrawal as a ground for 
termination of presidential duties as per the Constitution of Ukraine. 
Pursuant to Article 108 of the Constitution, the duties of the 
President may be terminated before the expiry of his/her term in 
office on the grounds of: (1) resignation, (2) inability to perform 
his/her duties for health reasons, (3) removal from office by means of 
the impeachment procedure, and (4) death.96 In the case of 
resignation, the president must personally tender his resignation at a 
parliamentary hearing.97 As former President Yanukovych neither 
tendered his resignation nor was removed from office through the 
impeachment procedure, the validity of the declaration signed by the 
Chairperson of the Parliament has been subject to discussion.98  
 At first sight, a narrow textual reading of the constitutional 
provisions renders questionable the legality of the parliamentary 
decision on bestowing presidential duties on the Chairperson of 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in the face of Yanukovych’s self-
withdrawal. However, a broader teleological reading of the 
Constitution, in light of its democratic principles and foundations, 
would render the presidential mandate illegitimate if the President 
breached the oath he had undertaken when assuming his office and is 
suspected of directing crimes against humanity against his country’s 
own nationals. The failure to serve for the good of his country and the 
dereliction of duty in protecting the rights and freedoms of its citizen 
must effectively be viewed as being incompatible with the 
presidential mandate.  
 Although the international community opposes the 
unconstitutional and forceful change of a democratically elected 
government, it appears that in recent years the distinction has been 
made between “legitimate popular uprisings against authoritarian 
rulers” and “unconstitutional changes of government.”99 In the 
                                                                                                                            
 95.  See Declaration I, supra note 66 (containing Oleksandr Turchynov’s 
electronic signature at the end of the document). 
 96.  Конституція України (Constitution of Ukraine) art. 108 (Ukr.). 
 97.  Id art. 109. 
 98.  See News of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych Press Conference in Rostov 11-03-
14, YOUTUBE (Mar. 11, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uR8IPqVYd84 
[https://perma.cc/8GJ6-99CS] (archived Feb. 15, 2016) (depicting the press conference 
on March 11, 2014 in Rostov-on-Don, Russia where Yanukovych gave an official press 
conference during which he ascertained that he was a legitimate president of Ukraine 
after he fled Ukraine).  
 99.  See EUR. PARL., Actions of the African Union Against Coups D’état, 2 (Mar. 
2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2015/551307/EPRS_ATA 
(2015)551307_EN.pdf [perma.cc/8HXU-6UXC] (archived Jan. 24, 2016) (detailing the 
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context of the Egyptian uprising against former President Hosni 
Mubarak’s regime and other uprisings in North Africa, the African 
Union panel proposed a number of criteria that would render the 
unconstitutional change of a government (UCG) legitimate, such as 
(a) the descent of the government into total authoritarianism to the 
point of forfeiting its legitimacy, (b) the absence or total 
ineffectiveness of constitutional processes for effecting change of 
government, (c) the popularity of the uprisings in the sense of 
attracting a significant portion of the population and involving people 
from all walks of life and ideological persuasions, (d) the absence of 
involvement of the military in removing the government, and (e) the 
peacefulness of the popular protests.100 The proposed criteria reflect 
the latest developments in the international arena when 
authoritarian governments that show gross disregard for the human 
rights of its citizens are destined to crumble under pressure. The 
legitimacy of UCG is also tested through governmental recognition by 
another state(s), which entails that “the recognizing state(s) will deal 
with the government as the governing authority of the state and 
accept the usual legal consequences of such status.”101 As Thomas 
Franck points out, while not yet encapsulated in law, but rapidly 
becoming a norm within the international system, the right to govern 
is contingent on a government having met both the democratic 
entitlement of the governed as well as the standards of the 
community of states.102 The legitimacy of a government is closely 
linked to the rite of recognition. This act of recognition by a foreign 
government endows a new regime with a range of entitlements and 
duties that are concomitant with sovereignty and will in turn bestow 
upon a de facto regime the status of “official government.”103 When a 
new regime is recognized as validly representing the state in its 
foreign relations, it can avail itself of rights accorded to sovereigns 
under international law, of which the lawful negotiation and 
conclusion of international agreements form an indispensable part.104 
 In the present case, President Yanukovych left Ukraine in the 
absence of a coup d’état or other similar undemocratic attempt at 
                                                                                                                            
African Union’s approach that distinguishes between these two different efforts to 
change the government). 
 100. Final Report of the African Union High-Level Panel for Egypt, AFRICAN 
UNION PEACE & SECURITY, June 17, 2014, § 83, http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/final-
report-of-the-african-union-high-level-panel-for-egypt#sthash.odJRzlx8.dpuf [perma.cc/ 
LUT9-H7SX] (archived Jan. 24, 2016).  
 101.  MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 455 (6th ed. 2008); Jonte van 
Essen, De Facto Regimes in International Law, 28 UTRECHT J. INT’L & EUR. L. 31, 40 
(2012). 
 102.  T. M. Franck, Legitimacy and the Democratic Entitlement, in DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 25, 26 (G.H Fox and B. R. Roth eds., 2000). 
 103.  See T. M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 705, 726 (1988); van Essen, supra note 101, at 32–39. 
 104.  See S. D. Murphy, Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States 
and Government, 48 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 545, 545-46 (1999). 
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ousting him from his post. Instead, his departure was triggered by 
public protests calling for his resignation in the face of the waning 
legitimacy of his presidential mandate.105 The change of the 
Ukrainian government was widely accepted internationally as an 
expression of the Ukrainian people’s right to demand democratic 
change.106 In light of this, the position of the author of this Article is 
that the new government was legitimately instituted, and therefore 
the chairperson of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in his capacity as ex 
officio Head of State was entitled to submit a binding declaration to 
the ICC, which subjects Ukraine to the jurisdiction of the Court.  
 On a separate note, it still remains unclear why Verkhovna Rada 
of Ukraine did not choose a more definite path towards the removal of 
Viktor Yanukovych from his office by means of the impeachment 
procedure. Although the procedure itself is fairly complicated and 
time-consuming, it was undoubtedly worth pursuing and would have 
dispelled any doubts regarding the legal capacity of the ex officio 
Head of the State to act on behalf of the state. Pursuant to Article 111 
of the Constitution of Ukraine, the impeachment procedure is 
initiated by a parliamentary majority if the President of Ukraine is 
suspected of committing treason or another crime.107 As a result, the 
parliament of Ukraine should establish an ad hoc temporary 
investigative commission to conduct an investigation into the crimes 
allegedly committed by the President.108 The decision on indicting 
the President of Ukraine should be adopted by two-thirds of a 
parliamentary majority, following a special plenary session, in which 
the findings of the investigative commission are heard.109 The very 
decision on the removal of the President of Ukraine from office 
through the impeachment procedure should be adopted by at least 
three-fourths of the members of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and 
should be accompanied by both a ruling by the Constitutional Court 
of Ukraine that states that the impeachment procedure has been 
conducted in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine and the 
ruling of the Supreme Court of Ukraine that the crimes on the basis 
of which the President is indicted contain the legal elements of state 
treason or another crime.110 
                                                                                                                            
 105.  See UKRAINE: TIMELINE OF EVENTS, supra note 74 (providing an overview 
of major events from the Orange Revolution until present). 
 106.  See Press Release, Ukraine Accepts ICC Jurisdiction, supra note 85. 
 107.  See Конституція України (Constitution of Ukraine) art. 111 (Ukr.) 
(providing for impeachment procedure of the President of Ukraine). 
 108.  See id. (stating that the commission should be composed of a special 
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 109.  See id.  
 110.  See id. 
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2. Naming of Suspects 
 The first declaration implicates a number of senior Ukrainian 
officials—including, among others, the former President of Ukraine 
Viktor Yanykovych, the former General Prosecutor of Ukraine Viktor 
Pshonka, and the former Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine 
Vitaliy Zakharchenko—in the commission of the alleged crimes.111 
There is no official information available about the whereabouts of 
the suspects who were named in the declaration, although it is widely 
reported in the media that they have all fled to and currently reside 
in Russia.112 However, in naming a list of suspects, Verkhovna Rada 
of Ukraine exceeded its competence, as it is within discretion of the 
ICC Prosecutor to initiate an investigation upon the authorization 
from the Pre-Trial Chamber and identify suspect(s) on the basis of 
the available evidence.113  
3.  Temporal Jurisdiction  
 The ratione temporis jurisdiction, as outlined in the first 
declaration, covers the period from November 30, 2013, to February 
22, 2014.114 This entails that the ICC Prosecutor, acting on the 
declaration, is entitled to investigate the crimes within given time 
framework. Although the declaration was lodged shortly after the 
annexation of the autonomous republic of Crimea by the Russian 
Federation in March 2015 and at the backdrop of the emerging 
conflict in eastern Ukraine, its temporal scope is only limited to the 
crimes committed during the Maydan protests.115 With the escalation 
of the conflict in eastern Ukraine and widely reported incidents of 
                                                                                                                            
 111.  See Declaration I, supra note 66 (appealing to the ICC to bring senior 
Ukrainian officials to justice).  
 112.  It is reported that all suspects were granted Russian citizenship and 
currently reside on the territory of Russia. There have been speculations that Viktor 
Pshonka attempted to leave Russia for Kazakhstan. See E. Borovskaya, Где они теперь: 
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https://openrussia.org/post/view/2920/ [perma.cc/T9TG-XCZL] (archived Jan. 24, 2016). 
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IZVESTIA NEWS (Mar. 25 2015), http://izvestia.ru/news/584507 [perma.cc/N47G-DX69] 
(archived Jan. 24, 2016). 
 113.  See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 53.  
 114.  See Declaration I, supra note 66 (stating that during the period of peaceful 
protests mass murder of Ukrainian nationals took place).   
 115.  See id.  
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war crimes, the importance of expanding the scope of the existing 
declaration or lodging a new one was broadly debated.116  
B. The ICC Prosecutor’s Decision Not to Act on Declaration I as a 
Missed Opportunity  
 At the time of writing this Article, which was before the decision 
of the ICC Prosecutor not to act on the declaration became public,117 
the author argued that, in deciding whether to initiate an 
investigation into the alleged crimes against humanity, the 
Prosecutor would have to grapple with a number of important legal 
issues, such as the validity of the acceptance of the ICC’s ad hoc 
jurisdiction by the Ukrainian interim government and the important 
jurisdictional issue as to whether the OTP may proceed with an 
investigation of the alleged crimes, notwithstanding the earlier ruling 
of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on nonconformity of the ICC’s 
principle of complementarity with the Constitution of Ukraine. As to 
the question of the validity of the declaration, it is not clear whether 
such an assessment is supposed to be carried out by the ICC 
Prosecutor or the Pre-Trial Chamber.  It appears that until now the 
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber has paid attention to whether the person who 
signed the declaration on behalf of the state had the authority to do 
so.118 Since the ICC Prosecutor decided not to seek the authorization 
of an investigation from the Pre-Trial Chamber on the basis that the 
alleged crimes did not meet the threshold of crimes against 
humanity,119 the judges did not have the possibility to address such 
important issues as the validity of the declaration and the existence 
of the jurisdictional impediment imposed by the Constitutional Court 
of Ukraine. However, it is not even certain that if the case had been 
brought before the Pre-Trial Chamber, the ICC judges would have 
chosen to do so. Given the ICC’s lack of competence to demand the 
amendment of national constitutions or, more broadly, interfere with 
national constitutional matters, the Pre-Trial Chamber might have 
chosen to disregard constitutional law issues altogether and narrowly 
                                                                                                                            
 116.  See Rights in Retreat: Abuses in Crimea, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
November 2014, at 6, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/crimea1114_ 
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focus on whether a basis exists for initiating an investigation. It is not 
ruled out that the situation will eventually be brought before the Pre-
Trial Chamber, as the assessment of widespread or systematic nature 
of the attack associated with the Maydan crimes may be reconsidered 
in the future in light of the new facts.120  
 In deciding whether a “reasonable basis” exists for initiating an 
investigation, the ICC Prosecutor acted within the ICC’s statutory 
framework, considering whether (a) the information available to the 
Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed; (b) the 
case is or would be inadmissible under Article 17 of the Statute; and 
(c) taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of 
justice, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an 
investigation would not serve the interests of justice.121 It is worth 
mentioning that the reasonable basis standard is the lowest 
evidentiary threshold that has to be proved by the Prosecutor in order 
for the judges to be convinced of making a decision on the initiation of 
an investigation into the specific situation. This means that the 
information available to the Prosecutor, which is being served to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber, does not have be “comprehensive” or “conclusive” 
of the alleged crimes at the preliminary stage.122 In other words, at 
the preliminary stage, it is only necessary for the Pre-Trial Chamber 
to arrive at the conclusion that “a sensible or reasonable justification 
for a belief” that the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court have 
been committed exists.123  
 In the subsequent sections of the Article, the author will deal 
with the three elements of the required test for the initiation of an 
investigation into the situation in Ukraine, arguing that there exists 
the basis for the initiation of the investigation within the meaning of 
Article 53(1)(a) of the Rome Statute. The author further claims that 
by taking an overly narrow approach to the interpretation of crimes 
against humanity and deciding not to proceed with the situation, the 
ICC Prosecutor missed the bigger picture and disregarded the 
interests of justice.  
                                                                                                                            
 120.  See id. (noting that serious human rights did occur and the evaluation of 
those events may be reconsidered in light of new facts or information).  
 121.  Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 53(1)(a)–(c).  
 122.  See Pre-Trial Chamber III, Ivory Coast, supra note 118, § 24..  
 123.  See Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision 
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1. Have the Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the ICC Been 
Committed?  
 The first declaration submitted by Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 
alleges that crimes against humanity were committed during the 
crackdown on peaceful protesters by the Ukrainian law enforcement 
agencies that acted on orders from senior governmental officials.124 
Among the crimes listed in the declaration are killings, infliction of 
serious bodily harm, beatings, torture, abductions and enforced 
disappearances, unlawful deprivation of liberty, forcible transfer for 
the purposes of torture and murder, persecution on political grounds, 
and unlawful damage of demonstrators’ property.125  
 The violence against peaceful protesters, mainly young 
university students, was unleashed by a special riot police unit, 
commonly known as “Berkut,” in late November 2013, with the 
intention to disperse protesters.126 There are abundant video 
materials, which were also posted on YouTube, as well as recorded 
witness testimonies that confirm numerous instances of police officers 
and pro-government group of civilians commonly known as “titushky” 
(anti-Maydan activists) using excessive force against 
demonstrators.127 The violence continued to escalate in December 
2013 with reported casualties on both sides, and it spiralled out of 
control with the adoption of a controversial law on January 16, 2014, 
that substantially limited the right to gatherings and peaceful 
demonstrations.128 During the violent clashes between February 18 
and 20, the death toll of protesters almost reached one hundred, most 
of them being killed by snipers from rooftops in central Kyiv.129  
 The subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC encompasses crimes 
against humanity that involve the commission of any acts listed in 
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 129.  See Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, supra note 126, 
¶57.  
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Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the 
attack.130 It follows from the definition that crimes against humanity, 
unlike crimes under domestic law, have to be committed in a specific 
context, which translates into the following contextual elements: (1) 
an attack directed against any civilian population, (2) a state or 
organizational policy, (3) an attack of a widespread or a systematic 
nature, (4) the existence of a nexus between the individual act and 
the attack, and (5) knowledge of the attack.131 At the stage of the 
authorization of an investigation, the Pre-Trial Chamber has neither 
to address the knowledge requirement linked to the contextual 
elements nor the mental element for underlying acts of crimes 
against humanity, as these constitutive elements should be 
determined at a later stage of proceedings, once individual suspects 
have been identified.132  
 The “attack” refers to a course of conduct carried out against the 
civilian population that involves multiple commission of underlying 
acts of crimes against humanity enumerated in the Rome Statute.133 
In this regard, the civilian population must have been the primary 
rather than an incidental target of the attack. The materials with 
respect to the Maydan protests, which were made public by the 
Prosecutor General’s Office in Ukraine, show that a number of violent 
attacks were launched by Ukrainian riot police units, acting on orders 
from senior Ukrainian officials, against demonstrators who took to 
the streets to express their dissatisfaction with government 
policies.134 In its preliminary report, the ICC Prosecutor 
acknowledged that during the three months of demonstrations, 
protesters and other individuals were killed as well as subjected to ill-
treatment, including torture and other inhumane acts, by members of 
Ukrainian law enforcement agencies and pro-government group of 
civilians commonly known “titushky.”135 The report further continues 
that individuals were targeted on the basis of their opposition to the 
former government of beleaguered President Viktor Yanukovych.136 
                                                                                                                            
 130.  Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1).  
 131.  See id.; see also Elements of Crimes, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 
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This led the ICC Prosecutor to conclude that the violent acts against 
protesters unleashed by Ukrainian security forces and “titushky” 
satisfy the requirement of Article 7 of the Rome Statute, which 
requires the attack to be directed against a civilian population.137 
 As stated above, it is also necessary to prove that the attack was 
committed “pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or organizational 
policy,” which means “the state or organization actively promotes or 
encourages attack against a civilian population.”138 The adoption of 
Law No. 712-VII came into force on January 22, 2014, commonly 
known as “dictatorship” or “draconian” laws, and is reflective of a 
“state policy” on the part of the former Ukrainian government, which 
imposed restrictions upon the right to peaceful demonstrations by 
introducing harsh penalties and fines for crimes and acts associated 
with the organization and participation in demonstrations.139 
Likewise, the absence of any information on sanctioning the unlawful 
use of excessive force by the Ukrainian riot police also indicates that 
the former government authorized the use of force against 
demonstrators, condoned the behavior of police units, and attempted 
to shield those responsible for using excessive force against 
demonstrators. With respect to the policy requirement required for 
crimes against humanity, the ICC Prosecutor was able to infer the 
existence of a state policy to attack the civilian population during the 
protests from a number of factual circumstances, among others, 
“coordination of, and cooperation with, anti-Maydan citizen 
volunteers,” the “consistent failure of state authorities to take any 
meaningful of effective action to prevent the repetition of incidents of 
violence,” “the apparent efforts to conceal or cover the alleged 
crimes.”140 In light of these events and at the backdrop of the overall 
political situation, the Prosecutor concluded that the violent acts of 
security forces and titushky, which were aimed at quelling the 
protests, were carried out pursuant to or in furtherance of a state 
policy.141 
 One of the contextual elements of crimes against humanity, 
which proved to be decisive in the Prosecutor’s decision not to proceed 
further with the situation, is the widespread or systematic nature of 
the attack. The ICC jurisprudence is consistent with the developed 
practice of the ad hoc tribunals that defines “widespread” through 
“the large scale nature of the attack and the number of targeted 
persons” and “systematic” through “the organized nature of the acts 
                                                                                                                            
 137.  See id., ¶ 91.  
 138,  Pre-Trial Chamber III, Ivory Coast, supra note 118, § 42.  
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 141.  See id. 
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of violence and the improbability of their random occurrence.”142 
However, one does not have to prove both characteristics of the 
attack, as they are disjunctive and not cumulative terms.  
 At the outset, the Prosecutor dismissed the widespread nature of 
the attack, noting that “the alleged attack was limited in its intensity 
and geographic scope”.143 The Prosecutor referred to a number of 
factual circumstances in support of her conclusion, stating that “the 
alleged crimes were committed almost exclusively in the context of a 
limited number of clashes and confrontations between security forces 
and protesters” during the three-month period, and “the majority of 
the alleged crimes occurred in a limited geographic area within the 
city of Kyiv . . . particularly in and around Maydan.”144 The 
Prosecutor also looked at the number of persons who were killed and 
injured during the protests and concluded that the cumulative effect 
of the killing of at least seventy-five civilians and the injury of 700 
protesters rendered it questionable the existence of the widespread 
nature of the alleged crimes against humanity.145 The Prosecutor’s 
decision to rule out the widespread requirement is not surprising, 
given that the attacks took place in a geographically limited area and 
given the number of victims, which is much narrower in comparison 
to similar situations of violence that took place in peacetime in Kenya 
and Ivory Coast that have already been authorized for an 
investigation by the ICC Chambers.146  
 Following the evaluation of the widespread characteristic of the 
attack, the Prosecutor examined whether the evidence supported the 
conclusion of the systematic nature of the attack. She concluded that 
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crisis). 
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the systematic dimension of crimes against humanity was missing, 
given that the alleged crimes did “not necessarily appear to have been 
carried out in a consistent, organized manner or on a regular or 
continual basis.”147 The report lists a few examples in support of the 
conclusion, emphasizing that  “the alleged crimes occurred in an 
infrequent and often more reactive manner, determined by the 
different circumstances as events developed during the 
demonstrations.”148 Despite acknowledging the unjustified and 
disproportionate nature of the attack against protesters, the 
Prosecutor nevertheless concluded that the alleged acts fall short of 
meeting the systematic requirement of crimes against humanity, 
since they were “aimed to limit the protests rather than being part of 
a deliberate, coordinated plan of violence methodically carried out 
against the protest movement”149 and appear to have “occurred only 
sporadically, in limited instances.”150 
 The author disagrees with the Prosecutor’s evaluation of the 
systematic nature of the attack and argues that, despite the 
disjunctive test of “widespread” or “systematic” attack in 
international criminal law, there seems to be an underlying 
presumption that both elements have to be present. It has never 
occurred in the practice of international criminal courts that the case 
stood alone on the basis of crimes against humanity committed as 
part of a systematic attack against the civilian population. In the 
situation of Ivory Coast, the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed that it 
believed that the attack carried out by pro-Gbagbo forces against the 
civilian population was widespread and systematic.151 Interestingly, 
in reaching its conclusion that both requirements of the attack were 
met, the judges were only guided by the characteristics of a 
widespread attack (i.e., extended period time period in which the 
crimes were carried out, the geographic range of the alleged crimes, 
and the high number of victims).152 It seems that once the 
widespread requirement has been proven, the judges assumed that 
the systematic nature of the attack is also present.  
 In another situation of post-election violence, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber only addressed the existence of the widespread nature of 
the attack. This demonstrates that the jurisprudence as to what 
constitutes a “systematic” attack alone is underdeveloped and yet to 
be crystallized in the practice of the ICC. Hence, it is even more 
unfortunate that the ICC Prosecutor dismissed the situation at the 
early stage, without providing the judges with an opportunity to 
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construe whether the evidence of the Maydan crimes supports the 
systematic attack threshold required for crimes against humanity. 
The conclusion of the ICC Prosecutor on the absence of the systematic 
nature of the attack is also at odds with its earlier findings on the 
existence of the organized state policy to quell the protests and the 
selective targeting of individuals for their dissent with the 
government policies.153 These findings are clearly indicative of a 
systematic nature of the attack.  
 To sum up, the crimes committed during the Maydan protests 
appear to meet the threshold of crimes against humanity in the Rome 
Statute, and an overly stringent approach with respect to the 
interpretation of the systematic nature of the attack advanced by the 
ICC Prosecutor seems to be totally unjustified and defeating the 
interests of justice. The ICC Prosecutor also failed to consider that 
the Maydan crimes have left a lasting impact upon victims, surviving 
family members, and the public, which renders it even more 
important to prosecute those who bear the greatest responsibility for 
unleashing violence against the civilians who took part in the 
protests.  
2. Jurisdiction and Admissibility under Article 17 of the Statute? 
 In order to meet the requirements of Article 53(1), it is necessary 
to prove that the case is admissible before the ICC.154 Although the 
ICC Prosecutor did not go as far as to address the remaining 
requirements for the initiation of an investigation, the author of this 
Article will attempt to demonstrate that such prerequisites have been 
met. First and foremost, the crime must occur on the territory of a 
state that lodged a declaration under Article 12(3) of the Rome 
Statute, or a national of that state must have committed the 
offense.155 In the situation of Ukraine, it appears that both ratione 
loci and ratione personae are fulfilled, as the crimes were committed 
on the territory of Ukraine, and Ukrainian senior officials were 
allegedly implicated in directing the crimes against the civilians who 
took part in the protests. Despite the fact that many former senior 
Ukrainian officials, suspected of the crimes, fled the country and 
reportedly obtained Russian citizenship, the nationality issue would 
not be a jurisdictional barrier to the investigation of the alleged 
crimes given that the proof of ratione loci is sufficient per se. 
 Article 17(1)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute provide conditions 
for the admissibility of a case before the ICC.156 Despite the 
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references to the admissibility of “case,” it has been earlier expounded 
in the ICC jurisprudence that at the early stage of proceedings, when 
suspects have not been identified, a determination of admissibility 
involves consideration of one or more potential cases within the 
broader context of the “situation.”157 Article 17(1)(a) and (b) specify 
that the case is inadmissible where (a) it is being investigated or 
prosecuted by a state that has jurisdiction over it or (b) it has been 
investigated by a state that has jurisdiction over it, and the state has 
decided not to prosecute the person concerned.158 However, despite 
the existence of ongoing national proceedings, the case is admissible 
if the state concerned is unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out 
the investigation or prosecution.159 The twofold test, which includes 
the examination of the progress of national proceedings before 
turning to questions of unwillingness or inability, has been decisively 
confirmed by the ICC Appeals Chamber.160  
 In the context of the situation of Ukraine, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
would be required to review whether national proceedings are or have 
been conducted “in relation to the individuals and crimes that are 
likely to constitute the Court’s future case(s).”161 In a recent 
statement, the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko expressed his 
dissatisfaction with the progress of investigations of the Maydan 
crimes and noted that the first cases have already reached Ukrainian 
courts, while expressing concern about the organizers of the crimes 
managing to flee the country and obtain safe haven in neighboring 
Russia.162  
 The Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) made public the 
information on the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed 
during the Maydan protests.163 With respect to the use of force 
against demonstrating students on November 30, 2013, the PGO 
issued indictments under Article 340 (unlawful interference with the 
organization of public gatherings and demonstrations)164 and Article 
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365 (3) of the Criminal Code (abuse of power by a representative of a 
law enforcement agency that entailed serious consequences)165 
against fifteen senior government officials, including the former 
President of Ukraine Viktor Yanykovych and the former Minister of 
Interior Affairs Vitaliy Zakharchenko.166 Another incident of the 
unlawful use of force against demonstrators by the special riot police 
unit on December 1, 2013, is still under investigation, with the four 
low-ranking police officers identified as suspects in that regard.167 
With respect to the incident of the excessive use of force on December 
10–11, 2013, the two Berkut officers have been identified as 
suspects.168 As to the willful killings and intentional infliction of 
serious bodily harm against protesters that were commonplace in 
January and February 2014, the PGO issued indictments on the 
charges of aggravated murder under Article 115(2) of the Criminal 
Code of Ukraine against senior public officials, including the former 
President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, and the former Minister of 
Interior Affairs, Vitaliy Zakharchenko.169 The former General 
Prosecutor of Ukraine, Viktor Pshonka, was charged with abuse of 
power that entails serious consequences under Article 364 (2) of the 
Criminal Code of Ukraine.170 
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 The cases that reached Ukrainian courts mostly concern 
individuals who are low-ranking perpetrators. The Kyiv city district 
court (Svyatoshyn district) is currently hearing the joint case against 
the special police unit officers who were charged with aggravated 
murder (Article 115(2) of the Criminal Code), abuse of authority that 
entailed serious consequences (Article 365(3) of the Criminal Code), 
and unlawful obtaining of weapons, explosive devices, and 
ammunition through the abuse of authority (Article 262(2) of the 
Criminal Code).171 However, at the time of writing this Article, no 
verdicts have been delivered.172 However, the proceedings against the 
Ukrainian senior officials have been halted for procedural reasons, as 
their whereabouts are officially unknown. In January 2015, Interpol 
issued a red notice for the former President of Ukraine Viktor 
Yanukovych, albeit only in relation to the charges of embezzlement 
and misappropriation, which is of no significance with respect to the 
prospective ICC proceedings.173 
 At first glance, it does appear that the cases with respect to the 
Maydan crimes are being investigated by Ukrainian authorities. 
However, it may be questioned whether the first limb of the two-
pronged admissibility test is satisfied—that is, whether the case is 
being investigated by Ukrainian national authorities, given that the 
national proceedings mostly concern the crimes related to the abuse 
of authority, and progress has only been made with respect to the 
charges levied against low-ranked perpetrators.174 Further, the ICC 
Appeals Chamber held that “the national investigation must cover 
the same individual and substantially the same conduct as alleged in 
the proceedings before the Court.”175 Whereas at the preliminary 
stage of the authorization of an investigation, “the same person” test, 
in the absence of the accused, does not require further consideration, 
it is necessary to remark on the interpretation of “substantially the 
same conduct.” The matter was brought to the fore during the 
Gaddafi admissibility proceedings, in which the Pre-Trial Chamber 
concluded that Libya did not have to investigate the same 
international crimes, as it sufficed that the domestic proceedings 
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focused on the alleged conduct and not its legal characterization.176 
However, it was not the difference in labelling the crimes and the 
dichotomy between domestic and international crimes that led the 
Pre-Trial Chamber to conclude that Libya was not investigating the 
same case, but the fact that it was only investigating some “discrete 
aspects” of the case before the Court that the Appeals Chamber did 
not oppose.177 If one assumes, albeit hypothetically, that murder 
charges levied against Ukrainian senior officials and national efforts 
with respect to the investigation of such crimes suffice in 
demonstrating that the case is being investigated at the national 
level, the next step would be to turn to the question of the genuine 
willingness or ability of Ukraine to investigate the crimes in question.  
 At first sight, it does appear that Ukraine is willing to prosecute 
the crimes, but this has been questioned by the Council of Europe 
(CoE) international advisory panel, tasked with overseeing domestic 
investigations of the violent incidents during the Maydan protests 
and its conformity with the European Convention on Human Rights, 
which issued a damning statement, concluding that “in many 
respects, the investigations have failed to satisfy the requirements of 
the European Convention of Human Rights.”178 The conclusions of 
the report scrutinize the investigations undertaken prior to and after 
February 22, 2014. The panel noted that “there was no genuine 
attempt, prior to 22 February 2014, to pursue investigations into the 
acts of violence during the Maydan demonstrations,” which entailed 
substantial challenges for the investigations that commenced at a 
later stage.179 With respect to the investigations after February 22, 
2014, the panel concluded that “substantial progress has not been 
made,” which was explained by serious investigative deficiencies in 
the work of the prosecutor’s office both at the level of the PGO and 
local prosecutorial divisions, as well as the lack of cooperation 
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between law enforcement authorities in the investigation of 
crimes.180 
 The CoE report on the progress of national proceedings with 
respect to the Maydan protests casts doubt on Ukraine’s willingness 
to prosecute the crimes in question.181 One of the three indicators of 
the state’s unwillingness, as outlined by the Rome Statute, is that “(a) 
the proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or 
impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, 
in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the 
person concerned to justice.”182 In this regard, “serious investigative 
deficiencies,” as identified by the CoE panel, indicate the violation of 
the principle of due process and therefore seem to fall under the 
unwillingness criterion in the Rome Statute. 
 Although the ICC is not bound to investigate the acts of suspects 
who were named in the declaration, it would seem natural for the 
ICC Prosecutor to initiate proceedings against those who bear the 
greatest responsibility for the alleged crimes and go after the so-
called “big fish.” As mentioned in this Article, the most senior 
Ukrainian officials accused of directing and ordering the Maydan 
crimes are currently on the run and are speculated to have 
abandoned the territory of Ukraine and fled to neighboring Russia.183 
In the absence of cooperation between Ukrainian and Russian 
authorities with respect to the investigation of the Maydan crimes, 
Ukraine is unable to obtain the accused in order to proceed with the 
national prosecution of the crimes. This situation is indicative of 
Ukraine’s inability to investigate the crimes within the meaning of 
Article 17 (3) of the Rome Statute.184 In the context of admissibility 
proceedings in the Gaddafi case, the Pre-Trial Chamber held that it 
was necessary to assess the ability of a state to genuinely carry out 
an investigation or prosecution “in the context of the relevant 
national system and procedures.”185 It concluded that Libya was 
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unable to investigate the case in light of the challenges it encountered 
with respect to “exercising its judicial powers fully across the entire 
territory,” and in particular it was unable to obtain the accused.186  
 3. Gravity and Interests of Justice  
 At the preliminary stage of the authorization of an investigation, 
the “gravity” requirement is evaluated in a general sense against the 
backdrop of the entire situation as well as against the backdrop of 
potential case(s) within the context of that situation.187 As mentioned 
in the ICC jurisprudence, the parameters of a potential case could be 
defined with respect to:  
(i) whether the individuals or groups of persons that are likely to be the object 
of the investigation include those who may bear the greatest responsibility for 
the alleged crimes committed and (ii) the gravity of the crimes committed 
within the incidents which are likely to be the object of an investigation 
(including, inter alia, their scale and nature, the manner in which they were 
carried out, their impact on the victims, and any aggravating 
circumstances).188 
In the context of the situation in Ukraine, available information on 
the individuals who were associated with the Maydan crimes 
indicates that a number of former senior government officials played 
a crucial role in authorizing and directing violent attacks against the 
civilians who took part in the protests.189 Whereas the national 
proceedings against direct perpetrators implicated in murder and 
other violent crimes are progressing at a slow pace, all cases against 
senior officials are at the moment halted in light of their unknown 
whereabouts.190 The crimes committed by law enforcement agencies, 
on orders from senior officials, may fall within a broad range of 
underlying acts of crimes against humanity. As earlier argued by the 
author, they seem to have been committed in the context of a 
systematic targeting of demonstrators as part of an official plan to 
quell any form of dissent in the country.191 The crimes left an 
indelible mark on victims, surviving relatives, and the Ukrainian 
population, all of whom still struggle to come to terms with what 
happened and demand justice for the wrongdoings of the former 
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regime.192 There are no reasons to believe that the authorization into 
the situation would not be in the interest of justice.  
 Due to the procedural halt of the national proceedings against 
the Ukrainian senior officials who allegedly bear the greatest 
responsibility for the crimes during the Maydan protests but fled the 
country to evade the prosecution, as well as the gravity of the crimes 
committed during the protests, and their impact on the victims and 
population in Ukraine, it appears reasonable that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, if had been requested by the ICC Prosecutor, would been 
have been satisfied that the requirement has been met.  
V. DECLARATION ACCEPTING THE JURISDICTION OF THE ICC FOR THE 
ALLEGED CRIMES IN EASTERN UKRAINE AND CRIMEA (DECLARATION II) 
 As mentioned above, one of the problematic aspects of the first 
declaration is that it narrowly focused on the alleged crimes 
orchestrated by senior Ukrainian officials against fellow Ukrainians 
during the Maydan protests. The temporal jurisdiction of the 
declaration did not cover any crimes beyond February 2014 and left 
out the alleged crimes associated with the chain of dramatic events 
that unfolded following former President Yanukovych’s removal from 
office, such as the annexation of Crimea and the self-proclamation of 
independence by pro-Russian rebel groups in Lugansk and Donetsk 
Republics.193 Since April 2014, there has been ongoing fighting 
between Ukrainian government troops and pro-Russian separatist 
groups, with the former claiming to be conducting an antiterrorist 
offensive against pro-Russian rebels in its attempt to regain control 
over the rebel occupied parts of eastern Ukraine. 
 The fighting in eastern Ukraine gained international prominence 
following the shooting down of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 on 
July 17, 2014.194 The flight was brought down over the rebel-occupied 
territory and claimed the lives of the 298 passengers on board.195 
Following the tragic incident, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) issued an official statement calling all sides to respect 
international humanitarian law, in which it reiterated the absolute 
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prohibition of directing attacks against civilians and civilian objects 
during an armed conflict.196 In its statement, the ICRC for the first 
time explicitly qualified the conflict in Ukraine as a non-international 
armed conflict.197 Similar, in the context of reporting on the attacks 
in eastern Ukraine, the nongovernmental organization (NGO) 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) concluded that “the fighting in eastern 
Ukraine is governed by the laws of war applicable to all parties of the 
conflict and individuals who commit serious violations of the law of 
war . . . are responsible for war crimes.”198 The nature of the conflict 
in eastern Ukraine is widely debated due to the alleged Russian 
involvement in supporting the pro-Russian separatist groups, in 
particular whether the extent of such involvement transforms the 
conflict into an international armed conflict.199  
 Whereas the legal qualification of the conflict is of no significance 
with respect to the first declaration lodged by Ukraine to the ICC, 
given its narrow temporal jurisdiction, the situation was drastically 
changed when the Ukrainian government submitted a new 
declaration that recognized the jurisdiction of the Court over the 
alleged crimes committed in eastern Ukraine and Crimea.200 As 
stated in this second declaration, it was submitted “for the purpose of 
bringing senior officials of the Russian Federation and leaders of 
terrorist organizations ‘DNR’ and ‘LNR’ . . . in respect of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes . . . committed on the territory of 
Ukraine from 20 February 2014 and to the present time.”201 As in the 
case with the first declaration, the ICC Prosecutor will have to decide 
whether to request the judges’ authorization to open an investigation 
into the situation on the basis of the available evidence. At first sight, 
the declaration seems to have remedied the deficiency of the first 
declaration by accepting the jurisdiction of the ICC from February 
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2014 onwards for an indefinite period of time. However, the 
declaration raises a number of interesting legal issues, which are 
addressed below. For instance, as discussed previously with regard to 
the first declaration, the second declaration too brings up the 
question of who is entitled to sign the declaration accepting the 
jurisdiction of the ICC on behalf of the state.202 Despite Article 106 of 
the Constitution of Ukraine conferring upon the Ukrainian President 
the power to represent the state in international relations, administer 
foreign policy, conduct negotiations, and conclude international 
treaties, the second declaration is atypically signed by the 
chairperson of the Ukrainian parliament.203 Unlike with the first 
declaration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine expressly laid 
out the grounds that, in their view, permitted the chairperson of 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, acting in his capacity as ex officio Head 
of State, to sign the declaration; it is not clearly set out as to why the 
second declaration was not signed by the incumbent President Petro 
Poroshenko.204  
A. International or Non-International Armed Conflict in Eastern 
Ukraine? 
 As mentioned above, the conflict in eastern Ukraine is widely 
considered by the international community as being a non-
international armed conflict, which is understood as “protracted 
armed violence between governmental authorities and organized 
armed groups or between such groups within a State.”205 In order to 
distinguish a non-international armed conflict from other less serious 
forms of violence or internal disturbances, two criteria are evaluated 
in order to determine whether an armed conflict exists, in particular 
(a) the intensity of fighting and (b) the organization of the parties 
involved.206 The fighting between Ukrainian government forces and 
pro-Russian separatist groups, in its intensity and the organization of 
parties, has been recognized as meeting the threshold of a non-
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international armed conflict by international organizations and 
NGOs.207  
 However, the legal qualification of the conflict in eastern 
Ukraine has been challenged in light of the alleged continuous supply 
of weapons and soldiers by the Russian government.208 What 
remains unclear is whether the Russian involvement amounts to 
being “in control of” the rebel fighting in Ukraine and, therefore, 
transforms the nature of the conflict to an international armed 
conflict. Under international humanitarian law, intervention by 
another state that supports an armed opposition group(s) to the 
conflict may internationalize the armed conflict, provided that the 
state providing such support to the armed group(s) is in control of 
military operations conducted by the group(s).209 Although it is 
widely reported that the Russian Federation has been supplying 
weapons to the rebel groups in eastern Ukraine, the extent of its 
involvement, in particular whether it goes beyond financing and 
equipping rebel groups, remains uncertain. The Russian government 
officials have on many occasions denied the supply of weapons and 
manpower to the rebel groups in eastern Ukraine.210  
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 By alleging the responsibility of senior officials of the Russian 
Federation, the declaration suggests that the conflict in Ukraine is of 
international character.211 Under international humanitarian law, an 
international armed conflict “exists whenever there is a resort to 
armed force between States.”212 In light of the absence of an officially 
declared state of war between Russia and Ukraine, the lack of clarity 
as to the extent of the Russian involvement in eastern Ukraine, and 
the question of whether it satisfies the “overall control” test, the legal 
qualification of the conflict is far from settled. Should the ICC 
Prosecutor decide to proceed with the case, she would have some 
difficult decisions to make with respect to the qualification of the 
conflict, as such a determination directly affects the possible choice of 
war crimes charges. The qualification of the conflict has far greater 
implications, as its recognition as an international armed conflict 
could entail bringing charges against nationals of the state that has a 
seat as a permanent member in the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC). Such a qualification is fraught with serious consequences, as 
it may potentially shudder the entire foundation upon which 
international law and diplomacy are erected.  
B. War Crimes in Eastern Ukraine 
 Since the beginning of hostilities in eastern Ukraine, the number 
of casualties has soared to a staggering 25,439.213 According to the 
latest UN figures, this includes at least 7,833 deaths and at least 
17,610 injured in eastern Ukraine.214 In general terms, the 
declaration lodged by Ukraine describes the situation of thousands of 
Ukrainian nationals being killed, injured, as well as hundreds of 
thousands being forced out of their homes as a result of the 
conflict.215 It further provides one example of an incident of war 
crimes—that is, the shelling of civilians in residential areas of 
Mariupol on January 24, 2015, that claimed the lives of thirty 
civilians.216 Although the chosen incident, as a way to illustrate the 
commission of war crimes in Ukraine, is no doubt important, it stands 
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out oddly on a one-page declaration, given the widely documented 
instances of serious violations of international humanitarian law by 
international organizations and NGOs.217 Despite its mention in the 
second declaration, the ICC Prosecutor is not obliged to investigate 
just one instance of war crimes as identified by the declaration but is 
obliged to investigate all instances of war crimes that fall within the 
scope of the declaration.218 
 The drafters of the second declaration avoided some mistakes 
associated with the first declaration by refraining from naming 
suspects of the alleged crimes. However, they do allege responsibility 
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of “senior officials of the Russian Federation” and “leaders of terrorist 
organizations DNR and LNR.”219 Although the Ukrainian 
government has declared DNR and LNR to be terrorist organizations, 
this is of no significance with respect to an investigation conducted by 
the ICC, as it does not exercise jurisdiction over the crime of 
terrorism, which is normally prosecuted by national jurisdictions.220  
 Additionally, the ICC Prosecutor is not obligated to limit its 
preliminary examination to the responsibility of parties that have 
been identified in the declaration. By nature of its mandate, the 
Prosecutor will have to examine the responsibility of all parties to the 
conflict, including the responsibility of Ukrainian armed forces. In 
this regard, it is important to recall that, on many occasions, 
nongovernmental organizations have attributed responsibility to both 
Ukrainian government and separatist forces for indiscriminate 
attacks against the civilian population for their use of weapons that 
are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military objects 
with sufficient accuracy.221 
C. Annexation of Crimea and Its Significance for Declaration II 
 The second declaration speaks of the “Russian Federation’s . . . 
armed aggression against Ukraine,” evidenced by the annexation of 
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.222 This Article does not discuss 
whether the annexation of Crimea constitutes an act of aggression, 
which is a matter of public international law,223 but looks into 
whether the alleged crimes associated with the annexation may be 
prosecuted by the ICC. At the outset, it should be noted that the ICC 
cannot exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression before 
January 2017. Therefore, it is not in a position to make a 
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determination as to whether the Russian officials could be held 
individually responsible for the crime of aggression.224 The only 
available international judicial institution that can rule on whether 
the annexation of Crimea constitutes an act of aggression under 
international law is the International Court of Justice, which 
adjudicates the disputes between states.225 Such discussion, however, 
is beyond the scope of this Article as it warrants separate, in depth 
analysis.  
 With respect to the situation in Crimea, it could be questioned 
whether the annexation of its territory by the Russian Federation 
transforms the situation into an international armed conflict. In the 
absence of open armed hostilities between Ukraine and Russia on the 
territory of Crimea, it seems illogical to conclude that such an 
international armed conflict exists. However, the presence of Russian 
troops who exercise effective control in Crimea qualifies the Russian 
Federation as an occupying power under the law of international 
occupation.226 Under international humanitarian law, the territory is 
considered occupied when it comes under effective control of foreign 
armed forces, even in the absence of an armed resistance.227 
 Despite the statutory constraints with respect to the crime of 
aggression, the Office of the Prosecutor may evaluate whether the 
widely reported violations of human rights on the Crimean Peninsula 
could constitute crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Various human rights groups have voiced concerns about human 
rights violations that manifest themselves in discriminatory policies 
directed against ethnic, religious, or national groups opposed to the 
annexation—in particular indigenous Crimean tatars—as well as 
journalists and representatives of nongovernmental organizations 
who report on the situation on the Peninsula.228 There have been 
documented instances of enforced disappearances, harassment, 
detention, and prosecution of Crimean tatars and pro-Ukrainian 
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activists.229 Persecution against any identifiable group, enforced 
disappearances, and other inhumane acts—if committed in the 
context of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian 
population—may amount to crimes against humanity within the 
meaning of the Rome Statute and, therefore, are subject to the 
Prosecutor’s preliminary investigation.  
D. Missed Opportunities in Declaration II 
 The downing of the Malaysian airlines plane over the rebel-
controlled area in eastern Ukraine proved to be a turning point in the 
conflict and prompted the international community to openly 
recognize the conflict to be governed by the rules of international 
humanitarian law. In the aftermath of the tragic incident, the states 
whose nationals lost lives (The Netherlands, Malaysia, Australia, and 
Belgium) and Ukraine, on whose territory it occurred, submitted a 
request to the UN Security Council seeking the establishment of an 
international criminal tribunal under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
to “try those responsible for crimes connected to the downing that 
occurred over Ukraine on 17 July 2014.”230 Russia vetoed the 
resolution on the establishment of the tribunal, having proposed an 
alternative draft resolution that backed the UN investigation of the 
incident but fell short of calling for the establishment of an 
international tribunal.231 Following the failed attempt in the UNSC, 
the states that requested an international tribunal declared that they 
would probe into alternative prosecution mechanisms to try those 
responsible for shooting down the civilian aircraft.232  
 The act of downing the aircraft committed in the context of an 
armed conflict, which resulted in the loss of civilian lives, may 
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amount to a war crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC. When 
Ukraine lodged its second declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the 
ICC from February 2014 onwards, this would have provided an ideal 
alternative prosecution mechanism to the proposed international 
tribunal project that was stalled in the UNSC. However, a careful 
reading of the declaration leads to the conclusion that the prosecution 
of the downing of the plane is not possible, since the declaration 
restricts rationae personae only to Ukrainian nationals who were 
subject to the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, thus 
excluding those nationals from other states who perished in the 
incident. What remains unclear is whether the OTP is bound by the 
limitation with respect to rationae personae as stipulated in the 
declaration, as they have to investigate all instances of the crimes 
during the period of time outlined in the declaration.  
VI. CONCLUDING WORDS 
 The relationship between Ukraine and the ICC seems to have 
improved with the Ukrainian government lodging the declaration on 
the acceptance of the ad hoc jurisdiction of the ICC initially, with 
respect to the Maydan crimes, and subsequently, with respect to 
crimes associated with the conflict in eastern Ukraine and the 
annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. However, the 
implications of the ad hoc jurisdiction acceptance are far from clear, 
as it is at odds with the earlier ruling of the Constitutional Court of 
Ukraine that found the Rome Statute to be contrary to the 
Constitution of Ukraine. All attempts to amend the Constitution of 
Ukraine in order to accommodate the jurisdiction of the ICC have so 
far been unsuccessful. If Ukraine is to avoid a situation where the 
investigation into the situation is stalled by the Constitutional 
Court’s ruling on the Rome Statute’s noncompliance with the 
Ukrainian constitution, it must accelerate its efforts to make the 
necessary amendments to its constitution that would allow for the 
ratification of the Rome Statute. By committing to the ratification of 
the Rome Statute, Ukraine will demonstrate its unwavering 
commitment to international law, which cannot be more timely and 
relevant when viewed against the backdrop of the ongoing bloodshed 
in eastern Ukraine.  
 Most recently, the ICC Prosecutor decided not to act on the first 
declaration, concluding that the Maydan crimes had not satisfied the 
“widespread or systematic” requirement of the attack within the 
meaning of crimes against humanity. This gives the impression that 
the interests of justice have been overtaken by a very narrow 
interpretation as to what constitutes a systematic attack in the 
context of crimes against humanity. However, this may not be the 
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last word in the story, as Ukraine expressed its willingness to provide 
additional evidence with respect to the Maydan crimes.  
 While the first declaration has been shelved by the ICC 
Prosecutor, it remains to be seen what steps will be taken by the OTP 
with respect to the second declaration that touches upon some 
sensitive political issues, in particular the extent of the Russian 
involvement in the fighting in eastern Ukraine. Most hopefully, the 
heavy weight of the two declarations lodged by Ukraine would exert 
pressure on the ICC Prosecutor to act at least on the second 
declaration. A decision by the Prosecutor to not act on either of the 
declarations would be surprising, especially against the backdrop of 
the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, which takes place at the 
heart of Europe and is marred by widespread war crimes allegations 
documented by international organizations and NGOs. The 
implications of requesting the authorization of an investigation into 
the situation of Ukraine should not be underestimated, as it is a 
window of opportunity for the ICC prosecutor to move away from the 
widely perceived “African bias” in the selection of cases and 
demonstrate to the victims and the international community that the 
Court is not sitting idle watching how the conflict unfolds and more 
civilians lose their lives. While it took long seven years to request the 
authorization of an investigation in the situation in Georgia, it is 
hoped that the Prosecutor would be able to decide much sooner on 
how to proceed with the second Ukraine’s declaration, as it holds true 
that “justice delayed is justice denied.” 
